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Throughout the postwar era until 1995 labor productivity grew faster in Europe than in the United
States.  Since 1995, productivity growth in the EU-15 has slowed while that in the United States has
accelerated.  But Europe's productivity growth slowdown was largely offset by faster growth in employment
per capita, leaving little difference in growth of output per capita between the EU and US going back
to 1980.  This paper is about the strong negative tradeoff between productivity and employment growth
within Europe.  We document this tradeoff in the raw data, in regressions that control for the two-way
causation between productivity and employment growth, and we show that there is a robust negative
correlation between productivity and employment growth across countries and time. Our primary explanatory
variables to explain both the revival of EU employment growth and the slowdown in productivity
growth include six policy and institutional variables.  We find that several of these variables have significant
negative effects on employment per capita, both before and after 1995.  We also find a significant
time effect, that the increase in European employment per capita increased after 1995 for reasons that
go beyond our six explanatory variables, and we link this time effect to a secular increase in the labor-force
participation of women, particularly in southern European countries.  We conclude by suggesting that
evaluations of alternative policy reforms in Europe should take into account any offsetting effects
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2.  DATA ON THE TWIN TURNAROUNDS 
 
2.1  The Opposite Movements of Growth in Labor Productivity and     



















































































                                                 
7 We are grateful to our discussant Allan Drazen for pointing out that the data for the 1970s and 
1980s does not exhibit any tradeoff. 
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around retirement age were not large enough to explain substantial amounts of variation in 
aggregate employment. 




















































5.  THE RESPONSE OF EMPLOYMENT PER CAPITA TO POLICY 










5.1 The Previous Literature on Changes in Hours per Capita and 
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26 The changes in the output gap can also explain some of the higher rate of employment growth 
following 1995. 























































6.4  The Combined Effects of Policy and Institutions on Productivity 
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1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
No Post‐1995 Dummy
Counterfactual
Predicted1970‐1995 1995‐2006 Difference 1970‐1995 1995‐2006 Difference 1970‐1995 1995‐2006 Difference
United States 1.42 2.13 0.71 0.55 ‐0.04 ‐0.58 1.97 2.09 0.12
EU‐15 2.89 1.41 ‐1.49 ‐0.82 0.59 1.41 2.07 2.00 ‐0.07
EU‐15xMed 2.81 1.87 ‐0.94 ‐0.84 0.07 0.92 1.97 1.94 ‐0.03
Nordic 2.41 2.09 ‐0.32 ‐0.77 0.56 1.33 1.64 2.66 1.02
Denmark   2.74 1.15 ‐1.59 ‐0.85 0.67 1.52 1.89 1.82 ‐0.07
Finland  3.29 2.48 ‐0.80 ‐1.27 0.97 2.24 2.02 3.45 1.44
Sweden  1.72 2.49 0.76 ‐0.41 0.26 0.68 1.31 2.75 1.44
Anglo‐Saxon 2.73 2.18 ‐0.55 ‐0.72 0.46 1.18 2.01 2.64 0.63
Ireland 4.03 4.16 0.13 ‐0.66 2.01 2.67 3.37 6.17 2.80
United Kingdom 2.68 2.04 ‐0.64 ‐0.72 0.37 1.09 1.96 2.41 0.45
Continental 2.88 1.75 ‐1.14 ‐0.89 ‐0.13 0.76 1.99 1.62 ‐0.37
Austria 3.12 2.28 ‐0.85 ‐0.66 ‐0.18 0.48 2.46 2.09 ‐0.37
Belgium 2.85 1.42 ‐1.43 ‐0.68 0.50 1.17 2.17 1.92 ‐0.25
France 3.05 1.85 ‐1.19 ‐1.15 ‐0.16 0.99 1.90 1.70 ‐0.20
Germany 2.91 1.67 ‐1.23 ‐0.96 ‐0.33 0.63 1.94 1.34 ‐0.60
Luxembourg 2.50 1.92 ‐0.58 0.29 1.28 0.99 2.78 3.20 0.41
Netherlands 2.30 1.54 ‐0.76 ‐0.54 0.47 1.01 1.76 2.01 0.25
Portugal 2.85 1.70 ‐1.15 0.16 0.05 ‐0.11 3.01 1.75 ‐1.26
Mediterranean 3.15 0.24 ‐2.91 ‐0.75 1.92 2.67 2.40 2.15 ‐0.25
Greece 2.36 2.53 0.17 ‐0.33 1.13 1.46 2.03 3.66 1.63
Italy  2.71 0.44 ‐2.28 ‐0.43 0.74 1.16 2.29 1.18 ‐1.11
Spain 4.19 ‐0.24 ‐4.43 ‐1.35 3.69 5.04 2.84 3.46 0.61






Labour Productivity Hours per Capita Output per CapitaUnited States EU‐15 Nordic Anglo‐Saxon Continental Mediterranean
1980‐1995 Growth Rates
Labour Productivity (Y/H) 1.34 2.34 2.30 2.46 2.46 2.07
Hours per Employee (H/E) ‐0.13 ‐0.49 ‐0.02 ‐0.16 ‐0.77 ‐0.32
Employent per Capita (E/N) 0.51 ‐0.04 ‐0.74 ‐0.23 0.03 0.11
Capital per Hour (K/H) 3.56 3.68 4.06 4.44 3.47 3.52
Capital Deepening 1.17 1.11 1.23 1.25 1.07 1.05
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 0.17 1.23 1.07 1.21 1.39 1.02
1995‐2004 Growth Rates
Labour Productivity (Y/H) 2.29 1.41 1.92 2.11 1.63 0.63
Hours per Employee (H/E) ‐0.16 ‐0.39 ‐0.16 ‐0.37 ‐0.57 ‐0.29
Employent per Capita (E/N) 0.06 0.92 0.56 1.01 0.49 1.73
Capital per Hour (K/H) 3.56 2.81 2.86 3.99 2.99 2.01
Capital Deepening 1.20 0.95 0.96 1.20 1.01 0.73
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 1.09 0.46 0.96 0.91 0.63 ‐0.10
Difference, 1995‐2004 minus 1980‐1995
Labour Productivity (Y/H) 0.95 ‐0.93 ‐0.37 ‐0.34 ‐0.82 ‐1.44
Hours per Employee (H/E) ‐0.03 0.10 ‐0.14 ‐0.21 0.20 0.03
Employent per Capita (E/N) ‐0.46 0.95 1.30 1.24 0.46 1.62
Capital per Hour (K/H) ‐0.01 ‐0.87 ‐1.20 ‐0.45 ‐0.48 ‐1.51
Capital Deepening 0.03 ‐0.16 ‐0.27 ‐0.05 ‐0.06 ‐0.32
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 0.92 ‐0.77 ‐0.11 ‐0.29 ‐0.76 ‐1.12
Memo Items:
Capital‐Output Ratio (K/Y) ‐0.96 0.06 ‐0.82 ‐0.10 0.34 ‐0.07




and Total Factor Productivity, Countries and Country Groups, 1980‐2004Δ Tax Wedge ‐0.28 *** ‐0.21 ** ‐0.37 ***
Δ Employment Protection Legislation  0.25 0.34 ‐0.14
Δ Product Market Regulation  ‐0.55 ‐0.29 ‐0.75
Δ Average Replacement Rate ‐0.17 *** ‐0.11 ** ‐0.27 ***
Δ Union Density ‐0.47 *** ‐0.41 *** ‐0.56 ***
Δ Output Gap  0.51 *** 0.56 *** 0.46 ***
Δ High Corporatism ‐2.76 ** ‐1.87 * ‐4.20 ***
Post‐1995 Dummy 0.95 *** 1.09 *** 0.66 ***
Nordic
   Denmark ‐0.41 ‐0.64 ‐0.23
   Finland ‐0.43 ‐0.69 ‐0.23
   Sweden ‐0.88 * ‐1.12 ** ‐0.56
Anglo‐Saxon
    Ireland ‐0.33 ‐1.16 1.38
   United Kingdom ‐1.02 *** ‐1.45 *** ‐0.41
Continental
    Austria ‐0.30 ‐0.87 0.50
   Belgium ‐0.16 ‐0.76 0.82
   France ‐0.57 *** ‐1.16 *** 0.33
   Germany ‐1.78 *** ‐2.44 *** ‐0.86 **
   Netherlands 0.66 * ‐0.30 2.46 ***
   Portugal ‐0.68 * ‐1.32 *** 0.33
Mediterranean
   Greece ‐0.14 ‐0.80 * 1.09 **
   Italy ‐0.54 ** ‐1.06 *** 0.55 *
   Spain 0.02 ‐0.77 *** 1.62 ***
R2 0.47 0.47 0.37
N 314 312 312










†Δ Tax Wedge ‐0.38 *** ‐0.28 *** ‐0.25 *** ‐0.15 **
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Δ Employment Protection Legislation  ‐0.20 0.86 1.57 * 0.27
(0.82) (0.79) (0.87) (0.83)
Δ Product Market Regulation  ‐1.11 * ‐0.44 0.66 ‐0.05
(0.57) (0.55) (0.62) (0.67)
Δ Average Replacement Rate ‐0.21 *** ‐0.18 *** ‐0.13 ** ‐0.18 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Δ Union Density ‐0.43 *** ‐0.46 *** ‐0.45 *** ‐0.41 ***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Δ High Corporatism  ‐2.27 ** ‐2.04 ** ‐1.70 * ‐1.59 *
(1.04) (0.98) (0.86) (0.96)
Δ Output Gap  0.54 *** 0.52 *** 0.51 *** 0.38 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Post‐1995 Dummy 0.94 *** 0.86 *** 1.15 ***
(0.15) (0.17) (0.44)
R2 0.46 0.52 0.48 0.59
N 320 320 320 320
RMSE 1.25 1.18 1.31 1.09
Weighted by Population Yes Yes No Yes










†Employment Rate ‐0.84 *** ‐0.64 *** ‐0.74 *** ‐0.64 *** ‐0.63 *** ‐0.62 ***
(0.04) (0.20) (0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16)
Δ Tax Wedge ‐0.04
(0.06)
Δ Employment Protection Legislation  1.82 *** 1.66 *** 1.77 *** 1.62 ** 1.07 1.19 *
(0.62) (0.65) (0.60) (0.63) (0.81) (0.64)
Δ Product Market Regulation  0.48 0.56 0.54 0.58 0.98 * 0.8
(0.43) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.56) (0.52)
Δ Average Replacement Rate 0.10 *** 0.14 *** 0.12 *** 0.13 *** 0.13 ** 0.14 ***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Δ Union Density ‐0.06 0.03 ‐0.02
(0.08) (0.12) (0.09)
Δ High Corporatism  ‐0.94 ‐0.49 ‐0.73
(0.77) (0.94) (0.82)
Δ Output Gap  0.78 *** 0.68 *** 0.73 *** 0.67 *** 0.74 *** 0.76 ***
(0.04) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Post‐1995 Dummy 0.06 ‐0.14 ‐0.14 0.15
(0.13) (0.24) (0.18) (0.21)
R2 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.52 0.69
N 320 320 320 320 320 320
RMSE 0.92 0.95 0.93 0.95 1.18 0.86
Weighted by Population Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes








Post‐1995 TE High Corp. High Corp. High Corp.





(1) (2) (3) (4)
†Actual Predicted Fixed Policy Policy Effect Actual Predicted Fixed Policy Policy Effect
Pre‐95 2.53 2.12 1.82 0.30 ‐0.27 0.06 0.35 ‐0.29
Mediterranean Post‐95 0.52 0.90 1.18 ‐0.28 1.87 1.63 1.46 0.17
Change ‐2.01 ‐1.23 ‐0.65 ‐0.58 2.14 1.57 1.11 0.46
Pre‐95 2.26 2.38 2.41 ‐0.03 ‐0.04 ‐0.12 ‐0.28 0.16
Continental Post‐95 1.76 1.57 1.75 ‐0.18 0.76 0.92 0.80 0.12
Change ‐0.50 ‐0.81 ‐0.66 ‐0.15 0.80 1.04 1.08 ‐0.04
Pre‐95 2.00 2.33 2.27 0.06 ‐0.61 ‐0.80 ‐0.64 ‐0.17
Nordic Post‐95 1.92 1.38 1.80 ‐0.41 0.70 1.02 0.73 0.29
Change ‐0.08 ‐0.95 ‐0.47 ‐0.47 1.31 1.82 1.36 0.46
Pre‐95 2.52 2.56 3.14 ‐0.57 ‐0.23 ‐0.25 ‐0.92 0.67
Anglo‐Saxon Post‐95 2.23 2.13 2.57 ‐0.44 0.83 0.86 0.26 0.60
Change ‐0.29 ‐0.43 ‐0.57 0.13 1.06 1.12 1.18 ‐0.07
Pre‐95 2.32 2.33 2.39 ‐0.06 ‐0.15 ‐0.15 ‐0.28 0.13
EU‐15 Post‐95 1.44 1.44 1.73 ‐0.29 1.16 1.16 0.91 0.25





Tax Wedge 9.21 ‐2.67 *** 1.71 *** ‐0.96 **
(0.64) (0.53) (0.4)
Employment 0.87 0.74 ** 0.23 0.97 ***
Protection Legislation (0.36) (0.37) (0.31)
Product Market Regulation 0.9 ‐0.14 0.35 0.21
(0.24) (0.25) (0.22)
Average Replacement Rate 11.31 ‐0.90 *** 1.37 *** 0.47 *
(0.34) (0.31) (0.25)
Union Density 23.32 ‐7.93 *** 5.07 *** ‐2.85 ***
(1.17) (1.23) (1.07)








Tax Wedge ‐0.25 *** ‐0.25 *** ‐0.2 *** ‐0.14 *
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Employment 0.88 1.38 0.90 ‐1.03
Protection Legislation (0.75) (0.86) (0.30) (0.79)
Product Market 0.24 0.34 ‐0.99 ** ‐0.84
Regulation (0.49) (0.51) (0.48) (0.56)
Unemployment ‐0.08 * ‐0.01 ‐0.19 *** ‐0.21 ***
Benefits (ARR) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Union Density ‐0.29 *** ‐0.35 *** ‐0.49 *** ‐0.44 ***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
High Corpratism Dummy ‐2.95 *** ‐2.32 * ‐2.18 ** ‐2.04 **
(0.83) (1.22) (1.02) (0.97)
Output Gap 0.46 *** 0.55 *** 0.54 *** 0.64 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Post‐1995 Dummy 0.66 *** 0.75 *** 0.93 *** 0.91 ***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16)
Post‐ʹ95 Dummy (U.S.) ‐0.38 **
(0.17)
R2 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.53
RMSE 1.02 0.99 0.96 1.15












Table A11 234 5 6
Employment Rate ‐0.56 ** ‐0.46 ** ‐0.24 ‐0.43 *** ‐0.64 *** ‐0.39 ‐0.51 ***
(0.26) (0.22) (0.23) (0.13) (0.16) (0.31) (0.15)
Tax Wedge 0.01
(0.04)
Employment 1.05 1.88 ** 2.43 *** 2.72 *** 1.6 ** 1.49 * 1.56 **
Protection Legislation (0.94) (0.92) (0.90) (0.86) (0.64) (0.82) (0.76)
Product Market 0.27 ‐0.56 0.93 0.65 0.59 0.47 0.4
Regulation (0.50) (0.63) (0.68) (0.63) (0.44) (0.50) (0.44)
Unemployment 0.25 *** 0.15 ** 0.17 ** 0.14 ** 0.13 ** 0.16 ** 0.14 **
Benefits (ARR) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
Union Density 0.05 ‐0.16 0.14 0.08
(0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
Output Gap 0.65 *** 0.28 *** 0.31 *** 0.67 *** 0.49 *** 0.56 ***
(0.15) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.17) (0.09)
High Corpratism Dummy 1.23 ‐0.57 1.37 ‐0.25 0.24
(1.37) (1.30) (1.31) (0.21) (1.24)
Post‐1995 Dummy ‐0.06 0.20 ‐0.36 ‐0.13 ‐0.13 ‐0.41 ‐0.28
(0.27) (0.28) (0.33) (0.24) (0.19) (0.36) (0.21)
Post‐ʹ95 Dummy (U.S.) 0.46 *** 0.44 ***
(0.17) (0.15)
R2 0.51 0.27 0.31 0.30 0.63 0.51 0.56
RMSE 0.97 1.3 1.28 1.28 0.95 0.93 0.88
N 251 329 305 305 320 344 344
Exogenous Instruments Tax Wedge Tax Wedge Tax Wedge Tax Wedge Tax Wedge Tax Wedge
High Corp. High Corp. High Corp.
Unions Unions Unions
Notes Mediterranean Countries 
Excluded
Output Gap 
Excluded
All explanatory 
variables except 
output gap lagged 
by one year
All explanatory 
variables except 
output gap lagged 
by one year
Tax wedge not 
used as an 
exogenous 
instrument
U.S. included, 
with a separate 
post‐ʹ95 dummy
U.S. included, 
with a separate 
post‐ʹ95 dummy
All regressions include population weights.  In all cases, the Sargan statistic cannot reject the null of instrument validity at the 20% level
Source: Authorsʹ Calculations
Second‐Stage Regressions of Productivity on Employment and Policy Variables
Table A2